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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF UTAH 
BEN FIDEL SALAZAR, 
Plaintiff/Appellant 
vs. 
WARDEN, UTAH STATE PRISON 
Defendant/Appellee 
Case No. 910533 
Priority No. 3 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court pursuant to Title 78, 
Chapter 2, Section 2(3)(i)(j); Title 78, Chapter 2a, Section 3(g), 
Utah Code Annotated (1953 as amended), wherein the appellant 
appeals from the denial of a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, 
challenging the conviction for a capital felony. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
Did the Court strictly comply with the requirements, in 
accepting a plea to a capital felony, pursuant to Rule 11, Utah 
Rules of Criminal Procedure? 
STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
The texts of those statutes and constitutional provisions that 
do not appear in the body of the brief are included in Appendix A. 
1 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
If the Court did not strictly comply with the requirements of 
Rule 11, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, in accepting appellant's 
plea to a capital felony, then the decision of the District Court 
to deny appellant's Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus should be 
reversed and the plea of appellant withdrawn. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Appellant was charged in the Third Judicial District Court in 
an Information with the capital felony of homicide, murder in the 
First Degree, in violation of Title 76, Chapter 5, Section 
202(l)(h), Utah Code Annotated (1953 as amended). 
Appellant entered a plea of guilty as charged. A subsequent 
penalty hearing was conducted, and appellant was sentenced to life 
in prison. 
Appellant filed a motion to withdraw his plea. Substitute 
counsel was appointed, as it was determined that a conflict of 
interest existed with the further representation by trial counsel. 
A subsequent Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus was filed. At a 
hearing, the Court determined that the motion to withdraw 
appellant's plea had not been timely filed and dismissed the same. 
Following further evidentiary hearing, the Court denied appellant's 
Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Appellant Ben Fidel Salazar was charged in an Information in 
2 
the Third Judicial District Cour* L number 884991356, with 
c . - • j i." p.e
 (l J in i \ ' i. o J. <a 1 1 ID 11 o 1* 
Title :> Chapter 5f Section 202(1 m Utah Code Annotated (1953 
as amended) -'at lu* was accused of knowingly or intentionally 
sti ring 1 ing t I e Mi m 11 * iy»j ha / i ny her r previously convi cted of 
a second degree felony involving the use or threat of violence to 
a person. Two attorneys witl i the Sail; Lakrc Leqal Defenders 
Association were appointed to represent appellant. 
On September appellant appeared before the trial 
j u d g e , F , | mi 1111 mi i * 1 1 1 l 111 III' l in i mi 11 11 J 1 1 1 I M 1 1 1 1 'i i s t i i e l 
Coui: t, to change his plea. (Exhibits 1 and 2; Record pp. 13-34,' T. 
pp. 45 -46) The Court reviewed the matter wi th appellant and 
, ' ,. 1 a Statement, of Defer idai i I: wh :i cl i represented h. .•: affidavit 
connection with entering a plea o4 guilty Exhibi Record 
tf * 
September Ji 7, V 390, a p p e l l a n t f i l e d a Motion t o S e t As ide 
G u i l t y P l e a (Case number 881991356) After a p e r i o d o f t i m e , 
s u b s t i t u t e ( I n i n s r I  WH1 I ii| ipi 11 ml * M 1 In T c p i e s e n t . I lit* nl(l 1 e in ldn I \ in lli i s 
motion A P e t i t i o n to r Writ ut Habeas Corpus was f i l e d in 
c o n n e c t i o n t h e r e w i t h , and a hear ing was h e l d on both t h e Motion and 
I h n P p l i f i o i i S i P i i i U - ' i i i l i i MI II •' I II I ' I ' M The CO'Ui I de termined t h a t 
appellant's motion concerning the withdrawal of his plea had not 
been timely filed and the motion was denied, IT, H" " 
n J 1.1 ow J i'inji i in i PV.L den I i a i y hearing and argument, the Petition 
for Writ of Habeas Corpus was denied and Findings of Fact and an 
Order Denying Writ of Habeas Corpus was entered on Noveinbei " I'I'll 
3 
(Record pp.41-44). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Appellant is entitled to reversal of the Court's denial of his 
Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus and, consequently, appellant 
should be allowed to withdraw his guilty plea. In accepting 
appellant's plea of guilty to a capital felony, it was necessary 
that the Court strictly comply with the requirements of Rule 11, 
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. This rule incorporates the 
examination a court must make of the appellant to be satisfied that 
his plea of guilty is knowingly and voluntarily made as a matter of 
due process of law, pursuant to Amendment XIV, Section 1, 
Constitution of the United States and Article I, Section 7, 
Constitution of the State of Utah. 
The Court's inquiry was deficient in several areas. There was 
a failure to make findings and advise appellant regarding the 
nature and elements of the offense and that by entering his plea, 
he was admitting those elements [Rule ll(5)(d)]. The Court further 
failed to advise appellant regarding the minimum and maximum 
sentence that could be imposed or the process by which that 
sentence would be determined. [Rule ll(5)(e)]. Finally, pursuant 
to Rule 11(5)(f) there was no showing that appellant understood the 
plea agreement. 
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POlN'l I 
DID THE COURT FAIL TO STRICTLY COMPLY WITH THE 
REQUIREMENTS OF RULE 11, UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, 
IN ACCEPTING APPELLANT'S PLEA OF GUILTY? 
Appellant Salazar appeared l;»p>fi »n» Judge Moffa t: on Sej •• ' -
1989, for th<* purpose changing his plea t < ::) 1: 1: le charge of 
homicide, Murder Degree * capital offense, In 
v Utah Code 
Annotated amended). kppellant was represented by two 
attorneys assigned from the Salt Lake Legal Defenders Association. 
Tl :i€ !. ::  ::)]l ] oqi 13 w. i til: 1 Salazar and - Statemen Jefendant which 
represents Salazarfs affidavit ;.- connection v 1 the plea, are *• 
record in the matter. 
appellant, this statement was signed •, parties and j ea 
accepted. 
T i n 1 i p i I ' I I I I i i i l ' i l i l i e i i i t i i i h l 1 cil H ' . i l l f r o t i i p j 1 a n c i * w i l h R u l e 
1 n
 Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, In three areas 
Consequently, appellant was denied due process of law 1 ,ir,siirint i n 
Allien ill <• Jl "' , Serf inn I , Constitution of the United States and 
Article ; Section 7, Constitution of the State of Utah, 
The first area is the requirement nl Sech.(ir I ") ) I till ) if IN" lip 
I: 1 1 a t the Coux t fi 1 id th»* Salazar understood the nature and 
elements of the offense to which he entered the plea and that the 
plea is an admission nf .-* 1 1 i host-'" eleiiieivl " 
The following is the exchange between the Court and appellant 
regarding the elements of the offense: 
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Q: Now the State of Utah is required to prove your 
guilt in this matter beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Have you and your counsel discussed that fact? 
A: Yes, your Honor. 
Q: Has your counsel explained to you the elements of 
the crimes involved here and the proof necessary, 
that the State must produce to prove a charge 
against you under those elements? 
A: Yes, your Honor. 
Q: Alright, Mr. Bradshaw, have you gone over with Mr. 
Salazar, thoroughly, the elements involved in both 
these, in particular, in the Count I criminal 
homicide, murder in the first degree charge? 
Mr. Bradshaw: Yes, your Honor; both Mrs. Palacios and I have 
reviewed with Mr. Salazar what the elements the 
State would be required to prove—the degree of 
proof they would have to meet. It's my belief that 
Mr. Salazar understands those. 
The Court: That also your belief, Mrs. Palacios? 
Mrs. Palacios: Yes, your Honor, it is. 
The Court: Mr. Salazar, you agree with that? 
Mr. Salazar: Yes, I do, your Honor. 
Exhibit 2 Page 3-4; 
Record, pp.22-23 
The focus of the examination was whether counsel had advised 
appellant of the elements of the offense to which he was pleading 
guilty. The Court does not seek to determine whether Salazar 
understands those elements or admits that the essential conduct 
which would constitute those elements was committed by him. No 
attempt is made to determine whether Salazar understands that his 
plea of guilty is an admission of the elements constituting the 
offense. 
Subsection (5)(e) of Rule 11 requires the Court to find that 
6 
the defendant knows the minimum and maximum sentence that may be 
imposed upon him for the offense to which he is pleading. 
The Statement of Defendant used in connection with the plea 
outlines the possible penalty as "life or death". There is nothing 
in this declaration which outlines the procedure in a capital 
felony of having a penalty hearing in making the sentencing 
determination, except where the State promises to present no 
evidence in aggravation at the "penalty phase." (Record p.13) 
The following is the exchange between the Court and Salazar 
during the hearing: 
The Court: Well, have your attorneys gone over with you 
the possible penalties that can be imposed by 
the Court for the crime of criminal homicide, 
murder in the first degree, Mr. Salazar? 
Salazar: Yes, your Honor. 
Q: And you're aware of what those are? 
A: Yes, your Honor. 
Q: Are you aware that any recommendation by the 
State or by your attorneys; those 
recommendations are not binding on the Court 
at the time of sentencing, and the Court can 
sentence in any way that is consistent with 
law; do you understand that? 
A: Yes, your Honor. 
Exhibit 2, at p. 7, 
Record p. 26 
Again the focus of the Court in this area of inquiry is 
whether Salazar's attorneys have discussed with him the possible 
penalty. No attempt is made to determine whether appellant 
understands the penalty ramification of his plea. The appellant is 
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misled by the Court's comment concerning recommendations. In a 
capital felony, sentencing determinations are handled differently. 
Connected with Salazar's knowledge regarding the minimum and 
maximum sentence that may be imposed, but also impacting on (5)(f) 
of Rule 11, is the exchange between the Court regarding the plea 
agreement. The phrase in the Statement of Defendant that "the 
State would submit no evidence in aggravation at the penalty 
phase", is the complete extent to which this affidavit attempts to 
articulate the parameters of the plea agreement. 
In discussing this matter, the Court inquires, after accepting 
that affidavit, whether the State's prosecutor has further areas of 
concern. In an exchange, on the record, between the prosecutor, 
one of Salazar's attorneys, and the Court, there is an attempt to 
outline what effect the State's agreement to submit no evidence in 
aggravation at the penalty phase will mean. Salazar's attorney 
articulates that agreement in this way: 
Ms. Palacios: . . . what Ben understands is, that the State 
is not seeking the death penalty, although 
they do intend to submit the transcript as 
they did and argue that. Do you understand 
that, Ben? 
Mr. Salazar: Yeah. 
Exhibit 2 at page 11, 
Record p. 30 
However, when the State indicates that they would argue in the 
penalty phase that the defendant should spend his life in prison, 
Mr. Salazar objects, and there is a further conference, with the 
attorneys, off the record. The Court never makes an inquiry or 
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examines appellant regarding his understanding of the plea 
negotiations. 
In Bovkin v, Alabama, 395 US 238 (1969), the Supreme Court 
determined that, as a matter of due process of law, it was 
incumbent on the trial court, prior to accepting a plea of guilty, 
to satisfy itself that the defendant understands what he is doing 
and the consequences in entering a guilty plea. The Court spoke in 
terms of making an intelligent choice on the part of the defendant 
and the court satisfying itself with a record that demonstrates the 
defendant has made his choice with full knowledge. 
In McCarthy v. U.S. 394 US 459 (1969), the Court spoke in 
terms of a thorough interrogation of the defendant prior to 
entering his plea, which exposes the defendant's state of mind. In 
McCarthy, supra, there is a specific discussion regarding the need 
for the defendant to understand and to admit to the elements of the 
offense. 
In Henderson v. Morgan, 426 US 637 (1976), the Court again 
required that the defendant must understand the elements of the 
crime charged and the relationship of the law to the facts. 
In Utah, this due process requirement is incorporated in Rule 
11, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. In connection with a guilty 
plea, the courts have developed an affidavit or statement of 
defendant used in connection with accepting a guilty plea. 
In State v. Gibbons, 740 P 2d 1309 (Utah 1987), this court 
determined that there should be strict compliance with the 
requirements of Rule 11. Regarding the use of written affidavits, 
9 
the Court concluded: 
"The use of a sufficient affidavit can promote 
efficiency but an affidavit should only be the 
starting point, not an end point in the 
pleading process," 
Gibbons, supra, at page 13. 
The object of the exercise is for the Court to determine 
whether, in fact, the plea is made in a truly knowing and voluntary 
manner. Specifically, whether the areas outlined in Rule 11 have 
been covered and the Court is able to make its findings regarding 
a defendant's knowledge and understanding of the consequences of 
the plea. 
The Utah Court of Appeals has dealt with aspects of this issue 
on several occasions. Recently, in State v. Smith, 812 P 2d 470 
(Ut. App. 1991), the Court viewed the use of written statements in 
connection with the plea as an integral part of an efficiency 
promoting function. This does not detract from the standard of 
strict compliance in making the necessary examination of a 
defendant. The affidavit's function is to eliminate the need to 
repeat, to the defendant, verbatim, the inquiries of the affidavit. 
However, it is still necessary to interrogate the defendant in 
making a determination as to his knowing and voluntary plea. 
See State v. Vasilacopulos. 756 P 2d, 92 (Ut. App. 1988); State v. 
Valencia. 776 P 2d 1332 (Ut. App. 1989); State v. Pharris, 798 P 2d 
772 (Ut. App. 1990). 
In this case, the Court's use of the Statement of Defendant 
and its colloquy with Salazar failed to satisfy specific 
10 
requirements of Rule 11. The Court incorrectly focused on whether 
Salazar's attorneys had discussed these important areas of concern 
with him, rather than his understanding. An examination by the 
Court of the defendant, concerning his understanding of the nature 
and elements of the offense, that a plea is an admission of those 
elements and the sentencing ramifications, is necessary. It is 
incumbent on the Court to create a record which demonstrates a 
strict compliance with Rule 11 in making the examination. This was 
inadequately done in this case. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the Court's denial of the Petition 
for Writ of Habeas Corpus should be reversed and defendant allowed 
to withdraw his plea of guilty. 
Dated this ^JJ) day of ^j/^JFtA/^fl/lU 1992. 
Respectfully /submitted, 
Attorney fgf Defendant/Appellant 
431 South 300 East #101 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Tel. (801)322-1616 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that four (4) copies of the foregoing Brief 
of Appellant were delivered to the Attorney General's Office, 236 
State Capitol, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114, this 
February 1992. 
day of 
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APPENDIX A 
TEXT OF CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 
AMENDMENT XIV 
Section 1. 
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and 
subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United 
States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make 
or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities 
of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any 
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; 
nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection 
of the laws. 
CONSTITUTION OF UTAH 
Article I, Sec. 7. [Due process of law.] 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, 
without due process of law. 
TEXT OF STATUTES 
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure 
Rule 11. Pleas 
(5) The court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty or no 
contest, and may not accept the plea until the court has found: 
(a) if the defendant is not represented by counsel, he 
has knowingly waived his right to counsel and does not 
desire counsel; 
(b) the plea is voluntarily made; 
(c) the defendant knows he has rights against compulsory 
self-incrimination, to a jury trial, and to confront and 
cross-examine in open court the witnesses against him, 
and that by entering the plea he waived all of those 
rights; 
(d) the defendant understands the nature and elements of 
the offense to which he is entering the plea; that upon 
trial the prosecution would have the burden of proving 
each of those elements beyond a reasonable doubt; and the 
plea is a admission of all those elements; 
(e) the defendant knows the minimum and maximum sentence 
that may be imposed upon him for each offense to which a 
plea is entered, including the possibility of the 
imposition of consecutive sentences; 
(f) if the tendered plea is a result of a prior plea 
discussion and plea agreement, and if so, what agreement 
has been reached; and 
(g) the defendant has been advised of the time limits for 
filing any motion to withdraw a plea of guilty or not 
contest. 
